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The story is well-known. In the wake of Wimsatt & Beardsley’s attack on the intentional and the 
affective fallacy, it became suspect to judge literature by the author’s intentions or the reader’s emotional 
response. In this view, author’s intentions or ‘neither available nor desirable’ as a touchstone for literary 
criticism, since ‘(c)ritical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle’, as Wimsatt & Beardsley put it. Nor 
are the reader’s feelings an adequate criterion for sound literary criticism. Often, though, the exact nature and 
context of Wimsatt & Beardsley’s claims (for example their interest in judgement rather than interpretation) 
are conveniently ignvored. In that way, they could be turned into straw men by anyone who wanted to defend 
the literary study of authorship and affect. 
Today, the scholarly communis opinio is almost the opposite of the straw-men position: emotions 
are considered as an inextricable part of literary reading and criticism, and the biographical background and 
creative activity of the author are seen as valid research objects for a better understanding of the literary work. 
And so the author returns with a vengeance, as can be seen in literary sociology, discourse analysis, (auto)
biography studies, and cognitive cultural studies. The question then arises what is gained and what is lost in 
this return to authorship and affect.
Alistair Fox’s Speaking Pictures. Neuropsychoanalysis and Authorship in Film and Literature is a 
distinct intervention in this field. The book develops a neuropsychoanalytical theory of fictive representation 
from the perspective mainly of the author. Building on a range of literary and cinematic examples, it aims to 
redress the balance between the cognitive and the cultural, the cognitive and the emotional, the production side 
and the reception side. While performing this balancing act, it combines psychoanalysis with neurocognitive 
science and integrates elements of reception theory and cultural studies. The twelve chapters alternate between 
the history of ideas, the introduction of a new synthesis, and in-depth interpretations of literary works and 
films.
It is worth while taking a close look at the general argumentation Fox carefully expounds throughout 
the book. We can distinguish three main interwoven arguments with which he intervenes in current debates 
in cultural studies. The first one is an argument in favor of authorship (including the auteur of a film) as a 
legitimate object of study. The meaning as well as the value of a work of art, Fox intimates, can be grasped by 
looking into the personal fantasy which informs it. One could (and I certainly would) object that such fantasies 
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cannot be detected, because the author’s desires and fears are unavailable to us. However, Fox argues against 
the well-known objection that intentions are not traceable. Not only are they detectable by the scholar who 
examines images, motifs, and structures, they are also intuitively taken in by readers or viewers in a process 
of emotional attunement. Readers or viewers affectively respond to the author’s affects incorporated in the 
work. Rather than explaining this process in purely psychoanalytic or phenomenological terms, Fox employs 
neurocognitive evidence alongside Freudian notions to substantiate his claims. 
In neurological terms, the act of reading or viewing activates so-called mirror neurons, which imply the 
mental replication of experiences encoded in the work. Fox, however, assumes that the experiences involved 
go beyond the rudimentary perceptual and sensorimotor mirrorings discovered by Vittorio Gallese and the 
concomitant phenomenological experiences Gallese discussed elsewhere. They extend to the patterns of 
attachment and detachment which are installed in early childhood. Author and reader/viewer are joined in an 
intersubjective exchange through the affective positions inscribed in the work, e.g. a longing for emotional 
care by a mother figure. In fact, Fox considers the relationship between the subject and the work of art as 
analogous to that between child and mother.
 This brings me to the second argumentative thread: a plea for neuropsychoanalysis. In the first, eighth 
and ninth chapter, Fox sketches a history of approaches to fictive representation from the perspective of 
production and reception. Of particular importance for the book’s own framework are the psychoanalytic 
and the cognitive tradition. While valuing the Freudian legacy Fox also criticizes Freudian psychoanalytic 
criticism for its focus on repression and defense mechanisms. In this logic, literary works comprise materials 
from the unconscious which are displaced, condensed, and reversed by the author to ward him or her off from 
psychological threats. 
Fox seeks to counter this limitative and speculative approach in two ways, firstly by using object-relations 
theory and secondly by taking the neurocognitive turn. Object-relations theory sees fictive representation not 
as defense but as ‘an instrument of self-repair’, a way to remedy disrupted attachment patterns. In that view, 
the work of art is an object mediating between subject and reality, and at the same time contains all kinds 
of objects invested with personal affects. In Fox’s readings, concepts of Christopher Bollas, John Bowlby, 
Daniel Stern, and Charles Mauron’s psychocritique are integrated into the model to elucidate how an image 
becomes ‘an unconscious organization’, as Bollas calls it. In Jane Campion’s films, about which Fox published 
a previous monograph, settings carry strong symbolic overtones. The water in The Piano and Top of the Lake 
evoke the ‘temptation to suicide’, to give one of Fox’s many illuminating examples. Another example are the 
many ‘obsessive metaphors’ in François Ozon’s movies, which Fox discusses in some detail.
Also, Fox emphatically prefers psychoanalytic views which prove to be consistent with neurological 
findings. Apart from the already mentioned mirror neurons, the theory of emotional systems developed by 
the neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp guides Fox in his analyses. In this particular blend of Panksepp’s views and 
a psychoanalytic framework, he follows the footsteps of Norman Holland in Literature and the Brain. Both 
Holland and Fox hypothesize that the systems of lust, panic/grief, fear, rage, play, seek, and care regulate 
the production and reception of fiction and film. So, for example, the film genre of comedy trades on the 
affective system of play whereas the thriller genre is logically connected to the fear system. Individual authors 
too respond to a particular emotional imbalance when shaping their fiction. 
The third main point in Fox’s argumentation pertains precisely to the role of emotions. Structuralist, 
poststructuralist, and (first-generation) cognitive approaches have shrugged off affective motivation and 
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emotions. By contrast, Speaking Pictures argues that emotions, and to a lesser extent embodiment, are a key to 
understanding why and how fiction is created. Whether it is the blockbuster movies after 9/11 which respond 
to a society’s anxiety and offer a ‘fantasmatic enactment of revenge’, or François Truffaut’s movies staging 
ambiguous emotions toward the figure of the mother, works of fiction are consoling configurations of affects.
 The three argumentative threads are brought together in a theory of fictive representation (though it 
should be mentioned that the two thorny concepts themselves, ‘fictive’ and ‘representation’, are not theorized). 
The ultimate goal of fictive representation is to bring into consciousness complex emotional experiences, to 
make them representable in order to achieve ‘a degree of emotional homeostasis’, and ‘to enable a processing 
of emotional content through the creation of fantasy’. For this purpose, the author selects motifs, objects, and 
images in which emotional content is externalized and transformed. He or she also draws upon genres and 
intertexts – which is the topic of chapter seven – as implicit models for complex emotional experiences. The 
readers or viewers, then, intuitively grasp the author’s intentions through the metaphors and structures of the 
work and adopt them for their own psychic needs. In chapters 10 and 11, Fox demonstrates this transference 
in a probing analysis of how an author/auteur adapts existing materials: Truffaut’s adaptation of Jules et Jim 
and Shakespeare’s reworking of the legend of Amleth. 
The issues Fox is discussing are very complex and he should be credited for the skilfull and compelling 
way he sets up the argumentation. The result of his inquiry is a more comprehensive model, which recognizes 
the role of personal fantasy, affects, and autobiographical memories, without neglecting neurological evidence 
and cultural constraints. In that respect, he fills a gap in the cognitive study of authorship. Whereas scholars 
such as Mary Thomas Crane and Patrick Colm Hogan have examined the cognitive procedures of authors and 
Norman Holland has studied the dynamics of reader response from a neuropsychoanalytic perspective, Fox 
shows how the Freudian unconscious can be coupled with cognitive concepts to study authorship. 
On the downside, Fox assumes that there is a direct and smooth channel of communication between 
author and reader through which unconscious content is transferred. Intersubjective attunement is presented 
as a natural and automatic process, whereas a lot of conventions and competence are involved in readers’ and 
viewers’ responses. He also seems to take authors’ stated motives (e.g. in interviews) at face value as reliable 
and sufficient evidence. He ignores the extent to which authors’ discourse is co-determined by its context and 
considers their deeper intentions as both ‘available’ and ‘desirable’ sources. Finally, Fox’s theory can give 
rise to a law-like motivation of interpretations, which is ultimately immune to verification or criticism. To be 
sure, neurocognitive evidence supports Fox’s theoretical claims, but in the implementation of the theory, one 
cannot avoid speculation. In that way, the theory can become a misleading excuse for readings that in itself 
are compelling and valuable. 
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